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COMMENT
A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION: ANALYZING
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTIGATORY
PRETEXTING UNDER THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
Chief Deputy District Attorney Mark Pautler lied. He told William
Neal that his name was ―Mark Palmer‖ and that he was a public
defender. This lie was not without admirable motivation; however, it
secured the surrender of a man who allegedly killed three women
with a wood-splitting maul.1 Despite the fact that Pautler‘s lies
furthered the public‘s safety, the Supreme Court of Colorado
determined that Pautler‘s deceit violated the Colorado Rules of
Professional Responsibility and sanctioned him.2
Attorney Stephen P. Hurley also lied. He used the services of a
private investigator to devise a sham computer research company so
that he could obtain access to a complaining witness‘ computer. He
similarly had admirable motivations; he believed the computer
contained information exonerating his client of all charges in a
criminal case.3 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin not only found that
Hurley did not violate any Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct,
it arguably implied that he may have violated the Rules if he failed to
lie in this situation because he would not be zealously defending his
client.4

In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002).
Id. at 1184.
3 In re Hurley, No. 07 AP 478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, at *21 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008).
4 Id. at *37 (noting the competing considerations that Hurley faced and concluding that
not engaging in the deceit would ―hand [the client] persuasive grounds for appeal, an ethics
complaint, and a malpractice claim‖).
1
2
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Both attorneys utilized ―pretexting‖ to gain access to something
desired—either the surrender of a criminal or access to information.
―Pretexting‖ is defined differently depending on the situation, but
generally involves disguising one‘s identity and purpose when
approaching a target to obtain potentially significant information.5
Technological advances, particularly with regard to the internet, are
making it easier than ever for attorneys and investigators to disguise
their identity and purpose in order to obtain potentially valuable
information. As evidenced by In re Pautler and In re Hurley,
however, it is not clear whether pretexting is a permissible tool under
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Bar is a self-regulated entity, charged with establishing its
own rules of professional conduct.6 Pretexting is clearly not
acceptable when it rises to the level of illegal activity, but its
permissibility is unclear when the conduct is not criminal.7 Although
some State Bar Associations have addressed this issue, many have
not, which is surprising because pretexting implicates two competing,
yet significant policy considerations. Supporting the use of pretexting
is the notion that attorneys should zealously advocate their clients‘
positions and do everything in their power to obtain the information
necessary to do so. Conversely, attorneys need to conduct themselves
in a manner consistent with upholding the image of the bar. Engaging
in deceit and misrepresentation does not improve the image of
attorneys. Therefore, attorneys looking to gauge the potential
implications of investigatory deceit must choose between zealous
advocacy and the potential for sanctions without clear guidance.
5 See Will Hill Tankersley & Conrad Anderson IV, Fishing with Dynamite: How
Lawyers Can Avoid Needless Problems From “Pretextual Calling,” 69 ALA. LAW. 182, 184
(2008) (defining ―pretexting‖ as ―a simple investigative tool: The investigator approaches the
target and, under the ‗pretext‘ of being someone else, obtains information that the target would
ordinarily provide to such a person. It is this combination of a disguised identity and freely
given information that makes pretexting a valuable, but potentially risky, technique.‖); David J.
Dance, Note, Pretexting: A Necessary Means to a Necessary End?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 791, 792
(2008) (―The investigation industry defines pretexting broadly as almost any form of deception
employed to obtain private information.‖) (quoting Michael A. Hiltzik, State’s HP Case May be
Tough to Win, L.A.TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at C1).
6 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009) (noting that the ―legal profession
is largely self-governing,‖ and that ―[a]n independent legal profession is an important force in
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a
profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice‖).
7 The use of pretexting to gather certain types of information is illegal under several
federal statutes aimed at protecting consumers. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801 et seq. (2006), as amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (making it a crime to obtain customer
information from financial institutions through false statements); Telephone Records and
Privacy Protection Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. §1039 (2006) (prohibiting obtaining confidential
phone records through the use of false or fraudulent statements, representations or documents).
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Part I of this Comment will examine the interests courts should
consider when addressing this issue. First, it will examine the many
Rules of Professional Conduct potentially implicated by pretexting.
Then it will lay out several broad trends that can be extrapolated from
the myriad of opinions issued on this subject. Finally, it will compare
the amendments several state bars have made to their rules in an
attempt to provide guidance. Part II will then examine the policies
underlying pretexting. It concludes that in weighing the competing
considerations, the scales tip in favor of upholding the image of the
bar and prohibiting the use of pretexting.
I. THE CURRENT RULES: AN UTTER LACK OF GUIDANCE
The American Bar Association (ABA) has not provided any direct
guidance on the ethical implications of pretexting, although the
language of several Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
―Rules‖) may be violated depending on the circumstances
surrounding the pretexting. In lieu of clear, uniform guidance by the
ABA, some individual state bars have dealt with the permissibility of
pretexting on a case-by-case basis or by proactively issuing a Bar
Opinion or amending the Bar Rules. Although very few of the cases
and opinions directly relate to pretexting activities on the internet,
they provide a useful view of the broader policy considerations that
are also implicated in the internet context.
A. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Pretexting activities potentially violate the language of several
Rules, regardless of whether the lawyer personally participates in the
activities or merely oversees them. As explored below, nearly all
pretexting conflicts with Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to
Others, and Rule 8.4 Misconduct.8 Additionally, the circumstances
surrounding the pretexting could implicate several other Rules. The
most significant of these include Rule 3.7 Lawyer as Witness; Rule
4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel; Rule 4.3
Dealing with Unrepresented Person; and Rule 4.4 Rights of Third
Persons.9 Finally, lawyers could face liability stemming from
nonlawyer assistants‘ activities under Rule 5.3.10 It is also important
to note that some courts broadly impose sanctions when the attorney‘s
conduct reflects poorly on the profession, and do not necessarily
8
9
10

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1, 8.4 (2009).
Id. at R. 3.7, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.
Id. R. 5.3.
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require clear violation of a rule.11 The fact that so many rules are
potentially implicated indicates the risk involved in pretexting
activities.
The most commonly cited rule in the pretexting context is Rule 8.4
Misconduct. The relevant text of the rule states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.12
Most significant to this situation is subsection (c) because pretexting
necessarily involves various forms of deceit and misrepresentation.
Additionally, Section (a) makes it clear that the lawyer cannot
circumvent the prohibitions of the rule through the acts of another,
which signifies that lawyers cannot rely on private investigators or
nonlawyer assistants to obtain the information without violating the
language of the rule.
In addressing the implications of pretexting under Rule 8.4, some
commentators find Comment [2] significant. It states that
―[t]raditionally, the distinction [between permissible and
impermissible activities] was drawn in terms of offenses involving
‗moral turpitude.‘‖13 Therefore, ―[a]lthough a lawyer is personally
answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice.‖14 Some argue that the ―gloss
on the rule‖ contained in Comment [2] should apply to the entire rule,
not just the section on criminal liability. Therefore, ethics sanctions
should only apply in situations that indicate a lack of moral turpitude
11 See, e.g., In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 482
N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (―It is clear that this court‘s power to discipline an attorney ‗extends to
misconduct other than professional malfeasance when such conduct reflects adversely upon the
legal profession and is not in accordance with the high standards imposed upon members of the
Bar‘‖ (quoting In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976))).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2009).
13 Id.
14 Id.
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rising to the level of a lack of fitness to practice law.15 But this
construction ignores the introductory language of Comment [2],
which states that ―[m]any kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on
fitness to practice law,‖ indicating that Comment [2] applies solely to
criminal conduct.16 If this construction could be successfully argued
to a judge, however, it could have significant ramifications on the
ability of lawyers to conduct or supervise investigations involving
pretexting.
Another significant provision applicable in nearly all pretexting
situations is Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others. The
relevant text in this Rule provides: ―In the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person . . . .‖17 Comment [1] to the Rule
clarifies: ―A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or
affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is
false . . . [or] by partially true but misleading statements or omissions
that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.‖18 It is likely
that any misleading or deceptive statements made in the course of
pretexting are material,19 so the issue under this Rule is whether they
are in the course of representing a client. While this will depend on
the specific circumstances surrounding the pretexting, it is likely that
at least an argument could be made that this requirement is easily
satisfied because the lawyer is typically engaging in pretexting
activities to collect evidence that can be used to aid in the client‘s
case. Even if this rule is not implicated, however, Comment [1] states:
―For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or
15 See David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for
Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the
Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 816–18 (1995) (arguing that statutory construction principles
―require that Rule 8.4(c) apply only to misrepresentations that manifest a degree of wrongdoing
on a par with dishonesty, fraud, and deceit. . . . it should apply only to grave misconduct that
would not only be generally reproved if committed by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawyer,
but would be considered of such gravity as to raise questions as to a person‘s fitness to be a
lawyer.‖) (emphasis in original); Barry R. Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations:
Conduct-Based vs. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2008)
(viewing Isbell & Salvi‘s analysis to conclude that the Comment‘s ―language modifies Rule
8.4(c), which should accordingly be read to prohibit only that dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that adversely affects a lawyer’s fitness to practice law‖ while also noting that
several commentators disagree with this construction) (emphasis in original).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2.
17 Id. R. 4.1(a).
18 Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
19 See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 15, at 813 (―[T]he misrepresentations made by
undercover investigators and testers are in fact material [because] [t]he very premise of the
misrepresentations . . . is that the party being investigated would have spoken or acted
differently if he or she knew the true purpose or identity of the interlocutor.‖).
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for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of
representing a client, see Rule 8.4‖; indicating that the pretexting
could still violate Rule 8.4 even if Rule 4.1 is not technically
violated.20
Depending on the circumstances, the pretexting could violate
several other Rules. If the pretexting is directed at another party in the
matter, Rule 4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
(commonly referred to as the ―anti-contact‖ rule) could be implicated.
This Rule requires:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.21
The key requirements in this Rule are that the lawyer knows the party
is represented and that the discussion is about the subject matter of
the representation. Pretexting will likely involve the subject matter of
the representation because the primary goal is usually to collect
evidence against the opposing party. Since the lawyer is targeting the
party, he is likely to know that the party is represented by counsel.
This rule also contains a prohibition against using another person to
communicate with the other party, so lawyers cannot use investigators
or nonlawyer assistants to circumvent the prohibition.22 Although
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is significant to note that
government lawyers likely have more leeway with investigative
practices under this rule in some jurisdictions.23
Another rule that may be implicated is Rule 4.3 Dealing with
Unrepresented Person, which requires:

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (20).
Id. R. 4.2 .
22 Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4. ( ―Alawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule
through the acts of another.‖).
23 See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (―[A] prosecutor is
‗authorized by law‘ to employ legitimate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising
criminal investigations, and the use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will
frequently fall within the ambit of such authorization.‖); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
4.2 cmt. 5 (2009) (―Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities
of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to
the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings‖). Cf. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d
1175, 1179 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting the argument that ―the Rules distinguish lawyers working in
law enforcement from other lawyers, apart from additional responsibilities imposed upon
prosecutors‖).
20
21
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In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer‘s role in the matter, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in
conflict with the interests of the client.24
This Rule is particularly significant because Comment [1] requires:
―In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to
identify the lawyer‘s client and, where necessary, explain that the
client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person.‖25
Pretexting necessarily involves withholding this information to obtain
the desired evidence or information, and therefore may violate the
rule.
Additionally, if the lawyer personally engages in the pretexting
activities or is present when they are taking place, he could be
required to withdraw from representing the client under Rule 3.7
Lawyer as Witness. This Rule directs that the ―lawyer shall not act as
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness‖ unless certain narrow circumstances apply.26 If the
pretexting activities become an issue at some point during the
representation, the lawyer may be a necessary witness and will
therefore need to end the representation.
Finally, the pretexting activities may violate Rule 4.4 Respect for
Rights of Third Persons if the target is not a party to the matter. The
relevant text of this Rule requires: ―In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not . . . use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.‖27 The Rule recognizes that ―[r]esponsibility
to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to
those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer
may disregard the rights of third persons.‖28 Therefore, any lawyer
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2009).
Id. R. 4.3 cmt. 1. (2009).
26 Id. R. 3.7; ee also id. R. 3.7 cmt. 2 (―The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of
fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing
party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party‘s rights in
the litigation.‖).
27 Id. R. 4.4.
28 Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (noting that while―[i]t is impractical to catalogue all [rights of third
24
25
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participating or overseeing pretexting needs to ensure that all rights of
third persons are not violated.
One final rule to note is Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants. This Rule requires lawyers to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that nonlawyer assistants do not engage in conduct
prohibited by the Rules and makes the lawyer responsible for the
person‘s conduct in certain situations.29 Therefore, the lawyer cannot
rely on nonlawyer assistants to take actions that would violate the
Rules if performed by the lawyer directly.
The fact that pretexting implicates so many Rules of Professional
Conduct mandates caution to any attorney wishing to engage in it. As
attorneys Pautler and Hurley30 illustrate, however, pretexting has
great advantages in conducting investigations. Several attorneys that
chose to supervise or conduct pretexting activities have faced the
possibility of sanctions, which has forced the judiciary to examine the
propriety of the issue under the Rules. Unfortunately, very little clear
guidance has emerged.
B. Judicial and Bar Opinions Only Add to the Uncertainty
Although it appears from the language of the Rules that pretexting
activities are likely not permissible, some courts and bar associations
recognize implicit exceptions to the rules that permit deceit and
misrepresentation in certain narrow circumstances. Others, however,
are not willing to recognize any exceptions, leading to extraordinary
confusion as to whether such activity is ever permissible. Courts in
several jurisdictions have considered the possibility of exceptions to
the Rules when determining whether pretexting activities that have
already occurred merit sanctions.31 Conversely, a number of state and

persons],‖ such rights ―include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third
persons‖).
29 Id. R. 5.3 (―[A] lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders
or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a
partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed,
or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.‖).
30 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 439
F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (not warranting sanctions); Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, 82 F. Supp.
2d 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (not warranting sanctions); Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Int‘l Collectors Soc‘y,
15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (not warranting sanctions); In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo.
2002) (warranting sanctions); In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984),
aff’d, 482 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (finding censure an appropriate sanction); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d
966 (Or. 2000) (warranting public reprimand).
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local bar associations have addressed this issue in an attempt to
provide guidance prior to any pretexting activities occur.32 Although
these opinions fail to provide a uniform analysis for determining
whether pretexting is ever permissible under the Rules, some broad
trends have emerged.
Several Bar Opinions recognize that the Rules implicated by
pretexting activities contain an implicit exception, but it is quite
limited. Generally, the prohibitions in Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c) do not
apply to ―misrepresentations solely as to identity or purpose and
solely for evidence-gathering purposes‖ that do not rise to the level of
fraud.33 In drawing the line between permissible misrepresentations
and impermissible actions rising to the level of fraud, these Opinions
focus on the ―gloss on the rule‖ contained in the Comment to Rule
8.4.34 Under this analysis, pretexting will only violate the Rules when
the conduct ―calls into question a lawyer‘s suitability to practice
law.‖35
Some courts use another analysis to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible pretexting. Under this analysis, they
examine both at the type of information gathered and how it was
gathered. The courts permit pretexting activity primarily when
objective information was gathered under routine circumstances.36
32 See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 323 (March 29, 2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org
/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion323.cfm
(―Lawyers . . . who
act
in
a . . . manner they reasonably believe to be authorized by law do not violate Rule 8.4 if . . . they
make misrepresentations that are reasonably intended to further the conduct of their official
duties.‖); Phila. Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (March 2009), available at
http://www.
philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSReso
urces/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (holding that deceptively accessing witness‘s FaceBook and
MySpace website is properly addressed under Rule 8.4); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op.
Comm., Op. 02-05, at ¶ 2 (March 18, 2002), available at http://www.utahbar.org/rules_ops_
pols/ethics_opinions/op_02_05.html (―[A] governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful
covert governmental operation . . . for the purpose of gathering relevant information does not,
without more, violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖).
33 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F.Supp. 2d at 475.
34 See supra notes 13–15.
35 D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 323 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics/opinions/opinion323.cfm. The opinion concludes that conduct that ―cannot be seen
as reflecting adversely on [the lawyer‘s] fitness to practice law; . . . will not violate the
prohibition in Rule 8.4(c).‖ Id. (quoting Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1738 (2000). See also Apple
Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (using statutory construction principles to conclude that Rule
8.4(c) should ―apply only to misrepresentations that manifest a degree of wrongdoing on a par
with dishonesty, fraud and deceit. . . . [I]t should apply only to grave misconduct that would not
only be generally reproved if committed by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawyer, but would be
considered of such gravity as to raise questions as to a person‘s fitness to be a lawyer.‖).
36 See Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (finding no violation because ―Gidatex‘s
investigators did not interview the sales clerks or trick them into making statements they
otherwise would not have made. Rather, the investigators merely recorded the normal business
routine in the Campaniello showroom and warehouse.‖); Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at
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Conversely, courts that found the pretexting activities violated the
Rules usually analyzed conduct aimed at eliciting information that
would not normally be divulged; frequently some kind of statement
that can be used as an admission of guilt.37
The use of pretexting in certain types of cases is more likely to be
permissible than in others. In particular, courts are more likely to
recognize an exception to the Rules where attorneys looking to
enforce civil or intellectual property rights are forced to resort to
pretexting techniques because ―it would be difficult to discover the
violations by other means.‖38 One court noted that limiting attorneys‘
evidentiary techniques so as to ban pretexting ―would preclude, prior
to litigation, the gathering of the necessary factual information to
determine if a valid claim for relief could be maintained and in its
most exaggerated context leave a party without a factual basis to
assert an avenue of redress.‖39 Additionally, pretexting is likely
permissible in situations where public lawyers are conducting official
government investigations.40 The court in In re Hurley41 even

474–75 (noting that the prohibitions of the Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 ―cannot apply
where lawyers and/or their investigators . . . act as members of the general public to engage in
ordinary business transactions‖).
37 See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1178 (finding Colorado‘s Rules of Professional Conduct
violated where the attorney used pretexting tools to obtain the surrender of an axe-murderer); In
re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000) (finding the rules of professional conduct violated where
the attorney pretended to be a chiropractor to elicit statements proving fraud).
38 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (―Undercover agents in criminal cases and
discrimination testers in civil cases, acting under the direction of lawyers, customarily dissemble
as to their identities or purposes to gather evidence of wrongdoing. This conduct has not been
condemned on ethical grounds by courts, ethics committees or grievance committees.‖); see
also Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (―[E]nforcement of the trademark laws to prevent consumer
confusion is an important policy objective, and undercover investigators provide an effective
enforcement mechanism for detecting and proving anti-competitive activity which might
otherwise escape discovery or proof.‖). But see In re Gatti, at 8 P.3d at 976 (concluding that
―[f]aithful adherence‖ to the language of the rules of professional conduct and case law ―does
not permit recognition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or false statements.‖) (emphasis in original).
39 Apple Corps. Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness
First, Inc., 912 F.Supp. 502, 508 (D. Utah 1996)). In this case, ―Plaintiffs could only determine
whether Defendants were complying with the Consent Order by calling [them] directly and
attempting to order the Sell-Off Stamps. If Plaintiffs‘ investigators had disclosed their identity
and the fact that they were calling on behalf of Plaintiffs, such inquiry would have been useless
to determine [the Defendants‘] day-to-day practices in the ordinary course of business.‖ Id. at
475.
40 See United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 476 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (―[O]pinions of
state and local bar associations hold [Rule 8.4(c)] do[es] not apply to prosecuting attorneys who
provide supervision and advice to undercover investigations.‖); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 323
(2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion
323.cfm (concluding that, although Rule 8.4(c) does not contain an ―authorized by law‖
exception, there is a ―general approval of lawful undercover activity by government agents‖);
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-05, ¶ 9 (2002), available at http://www.
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extended the exception that was previously recognized for
government attorneys to all attorneys in criminal cases because it
determined that there was no support for the distinction between the
government and criminal defense attorneys.42
Conversely, other courts and bar associations refuse to recognize
any exception to the rule, regardless of the extent of the
misrepresentations or the type of case involved.43 In justifying this
conclusion, courts point to the image of the Bar and the need to
uphold the highest ethical standards.44 Additionally, several courts
specifically uphold the prohibitions contained in the Rules for public
attorneys conducting official government investigations.45 It is
significant to note, however, that although the court in In re
Friedman46 determined that the attorney violated the Rules of

utahbar.org/rules_ops_pols/ethics_opinions/op_02_05.html (concluding that a government
attorney‘s use of pretexting ―does not violate Rule 8.4(c)‖ as long as it is part of an ―otherwise
lawful government operation‖). But see In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1179 (finding that the Rules do
not ―distinguish lawyers working in law enforcement from other lawyers, apart from additional
responsibilities imposed upon prosecutors‖).
41 No. 07AP478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, at *41 (Wis. Feb. 11, 2009).
42 Id. at *28 (―Dane County District Attorney Brian Blanchard, who filed the grievance
against Attorney Hurley, admitted that prosecutors frequently supervise a variety of undercover
activities and sting operations carried out by nonlawyers who use deception to collect evidence,
including misrepresentations as to identity and purpose. . . . but was unable to point to any rule,
statute, ethics opinion, or Wisconsin case that drew this distinction between prosecutors and
other attorneys.‖).
43 See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1175; In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ill. 1979);
In re Malone 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 482 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y.
1985); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 969 (Or. 2000); Phila. Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Guidance Comm., Op.
2009-02 (2002), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/
Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
44 E.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1176 (stating that ―members of our profession must
adhere to the highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regardless of motive.‖);
Id. at 1178 (―A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct. The jokes, cynicism, and falling public confidence related to lawyers and the legal
system may signal that we are not living up to our obligation; but, they certainly do not signal
that the obligation itself has eroded.‖) (internal citations omitted).
45 In re Pautler provides a shocking example of a court finding no exception to the rules
for government attorney. The court in that case determined that a district attorney violated the
Rules when he lied about his identity to obtain the surrender of an axe-murderer. 47 P.3d at
1175–78. Despite the fact that the attorney used pretexting to protect the general public‘s safety,
the court concluded that ―the Rules [do not] distinguish lawyers working in law enforcement
from other lawyers, apart from additional responsibilities imposed upon prosecutors.‖ Id. at
1179; see also In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (―[A] lawyer who holds public office must
not only fulfill the duties and responsibilities of that office, but must also comply with the Bar‘s
ethical standards‖); In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d at 1335–36 (―Decency, security and liberty
alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. . . . To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end
justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.‖ (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
46 392 N.E.2d 1333.
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Professional Responsibility by conducting pretexting activities, it
declined to impose any sanctions because the lack of uniformity on
the permissibility of pretexting under the Rules afforded the attorney
no guidance.47
Although this analysis provides a rough sketch of how courts and
bar associations view pretexting under the Rules, a large number of
jurisdictions have yet to even address the issue. Attorneys in those
jurisdictions have to determine whether pretexting is available as an
investigatory tool without any guidance whatsoever from their own
jurisdiction, and without any uniform trends in other jurisdictions. As
technological advances improve the ability to disguise one‘s identity
on the internet, more of these jurisdictions should consider addressing
the issue upfront, before having to determine its merits in a sanctions
hearing.
C. Rule Amendments
As lawyers have very little guidance regarding the implications of
pretexting activities, and courts struggle to apply the Rules to
challenged activities, several state bars have modified the language of
the Rules to clarify the permissible scope of pretexting. For example,
Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Oregon, and Virginia have created safe
harbors in certain circumstances for lawyers that participate in
pretexting activities.48 Additionally, New York issued a new rule to
provide guidance as to when pretexting is permissible.49 Like the
court and bar opinions previously discussed, however, there is no
uniformity in either the scope of permissible pretexting or how the
various bars address it in the Rules.
Oregon, for instance, adopted a safe harbor to Rule 8.4 in response
to the court‘s rejection of any exception to the Rules in In re Gatti.50
The safe harbor is fairly broad, permitting lawful ―covert activity‖ in
cases involving civil law, criminal law, or constitutional rights.51
47 Id. at 1336 (declining to impose sanctions ―[b]ecause respondent acted without the
guidance of precedent or settled opinion and because there is apparently considerable
belief . . . that he acted properly in conducting the investigations‖).
48 See ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2010); FL. RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2010); IOWA RULES OF PROF‘L Conduct R. 32:8.4, cmt. 6 (2005); OR.
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009);VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009).
49 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers‘ Ass‘n. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Form. Op. 737 (2007).
50 Or. State Legal Ethics Comm., Form. Op. 2005-173, 481 n.1 (2005) (―Oregon RPC
8.4(b) . . . was adopted in response to In re Gatti, in which the Oregon Supreme Court stated
that the then-existing rules against deceitful conduct applied to all lawyers, including those in
the public sector who engage in or supervise others in undercover investigations of illegal
activity.‖) (internal citations omitted).
51 OR. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009). The applicable text of the rule states:
―[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to
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―Covert activity‖ is defined as ―an effort to obtain information on
unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other
subterfuge,‖ and therefore clearly applies to pretexting. 52 Pretexting
activities may only be commenced, however, ―when the lawyer in
good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the
foreseeable future.‖53 In a Bar Opinion issued to clarify the changes to
the rule, the Oregon State Legal Ethics Committee clarified:
[I]t is evident that Oregon RPC 8.4(b) requires both an honest
subjective belief in the possibility that unlawful activity ‗has
taken place, is taking place or will take place in the
foreseeable future,‘ and some rational basis for that belief.
The rule does not encompass a good-faith belief merely in a
‗possibility‘ of unlawful activity, but a good-faith belief in a
‗reasonable possibility‘ of such activity.54
Therefore, although the safe harbor applies to a broader group of
attorneys, it may be limited by the circumstances of the particular
case.
The Florida Bar Association similarly added a safe harbor to Rule
4-8.4 that permits pretexting activities in certain narrow
circumstances.55 The safe harbor does not apply the Rule‘s
prohibitions against the use of dishonesty, fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation to a lawyer working for a criminal law enforcement
or regulatory agency.56 The Rule‘s Comment clarifies the scope of the
safe harbor: ―The exception acknowledges current, acceptable
practices of these agencies. Although the exception appears in this
rule, it is also applicable to Rules 4-4.1 and 4-4.3,‖ which deal with
truthfulness in statements to others, and dealing with unrepresented
persons.57 Therefore, Florida‘s safe harbor takes a narrower approach

supervise lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer‘s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules
of Professional Conduct.‖ Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Or. State Legal Ethics Comm., Form. Op. 2005-173, 485 (2005).
55 See FL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2010).
56 Id. (―[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer for a criminal law
enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise others about or to supervise another in an
undercover investigation, unless prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be professional
misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity other than as a lawyer by a criminal law
enforcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an undercover investigation, unless
prohibited by law or rule.‖).
57 FLORIDA RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4, cmt. (2010).
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than Oregon‘s, applying only to government lawyers as opposed to
anyone participating in certain types of cases.
The Alabama Bar Association chose to add a safe harbor to Rule
3.8 Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, rather than in Rule 8.4.58 The
Rule requires prosecutors to follow all rules that apply to lawyers
generally, but then allows prosecutors to supervise activities not
prohibited by law, as long as the lawyer does not ―personally act in
violation of these Rules.‖59 The Rule‘s Comment clarifies that this
safe harbor applies to pretexting activities by permitting the lawyer to
directly participate in activities that other lawyers may participate in,
but requires the lawyer only supervise activities that are prohibited in
the Rules.60 The Comment justifies the limited safe harbor by noting
the need to ―preserve the integrity of the profession of law.‖61
Additionally, although the safe harbor applies only to prosecutors, an
Alabama Ethics Opinion clarified that private attorneys in IP cases
may participate in pretexting activities prior to filing a case.62 Since
the target of the pretexting is not yet a party to any case and the
lawyer is technically acting as an investigator as opposed to a lawyer:
[I]n the pre-litigation context a private lawyer may use an
undercover investigator to investigate possible infringement
of intellectual property rights . . . and may misrepresent their
identity and purpose as long as their contact with suspected
58
59

ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2010).
Id. Specifically:

The prosecutor shall represent the government and shall be subject to these
Rules as is any other lawyer, except: (a) notwithstanding Rules 5.3 and 8.4, the
prosecutor, through orders, directions, advice and encouragement, may cause other
agencies and offices of the government, and may cause nonlawyers employed or
retained by or associated with the prosecutor, to engage in any action that is not
prohibited by law, subject to the special responsibilities of the prosecutor established
in (1) above, and (b) to the extent an action of the government is not prohibited by
law but would violate these Rules if done by a lawyer, the prosecutor (1) may have
limited participation in the action as provided in (2)(a) above, but (2) shall not
personally act in violation of these Rules.
Id.
60 ALA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2), cmt. (―Paragraph (2) deals with situations
in which the ethical obligation of the prosecutor as lawyer might prevent the government from
taking action that would not otherwise be prohibited by law. For example, in undercover and
sting operations, the making of false statements is the essence of the activity. . . . In order to
make clear that the prosecutor may cause the government to act in the fight against crime to the
fullest extent permitted to the government by existing law, paragraph (2)(a) makes clear that the
prosecutor may order, direct, encourage and advise with respect to any lawful governmental
action. However, where lawyers generally are prohibited by the Rules from taking an action, the
prosecutor is likewise prohibited from personally violating the Rules.‖).
61 Id.
62 See Ala. State Bar Office of Gen. Counsel, Form. Op. 2007-05 (2007).
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infringers occur in the same manner and on the same basis as
those of a member of the general public seeking such
services.63
This opinion is specifically addressed to the IP context, however, so it
is not clear whether it applies to private lawyers in other areas of law.
Iowa chose to add a comment to Rule 8.4 rather than amend the
rule itself. However, the exception to the Rule is fairly broad and
virtually mirrors Oregon‘s safe harbor provision. It reads:
It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients
or others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert
activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal
law or constitutional rights or in lawful intelligence-gathering
activity, provided the lawyer‘s conduct is otherwise in
compliance with these rules.64
Further, the Rule‘s Comment defines ―covert activity‖ as ―an effort to
obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of
misrepresentations or other subterfuge,‖ which clearly applies to
pretexting.65 Like Oregon‘s safe harbor provision, the covert activity
can only be used when the lawyer ―in good faith believes there is a
reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking
place, or will take place in the foreseeable future.‖66 The Comment
applies the standard broadly to government lawyers, finding no
violation of the Rules when the lawyer supervises or participates in
routine law-enforcement investigations.67
Finally, Virginia slightly modified Rule 8.4(c) and issued a Legal
Ethics Opinion to clarify how the modification to the rule might affect
pretexting activities. In 2003, Rule 8.4(c) was amended to only
prohibit engaging in ―conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation which reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to
practice law.‖68 In a Legal Ethics Opinion, the Virginia State Bar
Standing Committee on Legal Ethics applied this additional language
to pretexting activities conducted by federal government lawyers and
concluded that these activities do not reflect adversely on the lawyer‘s
Id.
IOWA CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY R. 32:8.4, cmt. 6 (2005).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (clarifying that ―a government lawyer who supervises or participates in a lawful
covert operation which involves misrepresentation or deceit for the purpose of gathering
relevant information, such as law enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or an
intelligence-gathering activity, does not, without more, violate this rule.‖).
68 VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT. R. 8.4(c) (2009) (emphasis added).
63
64
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fitness to practice law and therefore do not violate the rule.69
Although this Legal Ethics Opinion specifically addressed
government attorneys, it also noted that prior Virginia Legal Ethics
Opinions provide exceptions for the use of tape recording for housing
discrimination testers and ―the threat or actual commission of
criminal activity where the attorney is the victim,‖ while noting that
this list is not necessarily exhaustive.70 Although these exceptions
only apply to tape-recording conversations, the Committee extended
the exception to pretexting activities in general for government
attorneys; therefore, it may apply to these other categories of lawyers
as well. Since the language in the rule lacks the clarity of other Bars,
more guidance is needed to fully understand what the boundaries of
the exception are in Virginia.
Addressing whether a non-government lawyer can employ the
services of an investigator who uses dissemblance as an evidencegathering technique, the New York County Lawyers‘ Association
formulated a rule to provide more guidance on the issue.71 The
Association concluded that ―it is ethically permissible in a small
number of exceptional circumstances where the dissemblance by
investigators is limited to identity and purpose and involves otherwise
lawful activity undertaken solely for the purpose of gathering
evidence.‖72 In concluding that some dissemblance may be ethically
permissible, the Association noted that anything that rises to the level
of fraud or perjury or that violates the rights of third parties violates
the Rules.73 In an attempt to provide greater guidance, the Association
issued a rule to determine when pretexting by a non-government
attorney is ethically permissible:
(i) either (a) the investigation is of a violation of civil rights
or intellectual property rights and the lawyer believes in good
faith that such violation is taking place or will take place
imminently or (b) the dissemblance is expressly authorized
by law; and (ii) the evidence sought is not reasonably and
69 Va. Continuing Legal Educ. Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 1765 (2003) (―[W]hen an
attorney employed by the federal government uses lawful methods, such as the use of ‗alias
identities‘ and non-consensual tape-recording, as part of his intelligence or covert activities,
those methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his fitness to practice law; therefore,
such conduct will not violate the prohibition in Rule 8.4(c).‖).
70 Id.
71 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers‘ Ass‘n. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Form. Op. 737 (2007).
72 Id. at 1.
73 Id. at 2–3 (stating that ―[d]issemblance ends where misrepresentations or uncorrected
false impressions rise to the level of fraud or perjury, communications with represented and
unrepresented persons in violations of the Code . . . or in evidence-gathering conduct that
unlawfully violates the rights of third parties.‖).
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readily available through other lawful means; and (iii) the
lawyer‘s conduct and the investigator‘s conduct that the
lawyer is supervising do not otherwise violate the New York
Lawyer‘s Code of Professional Responsibility (the ―Code‖)
or applicable law; and (iv) the dissemblance does not
unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third parties.
Moreover, the investigator must be instructed not to elicit
information protected by the attorney-client privilege.74
While pointing out that there is no nationwide consensus on the
ethical implications of pretexting, the Association noted that Rules
must be ―applied in the light of reason and experience,‖ and that the
limited use of pretexting ―is most consistent with the overall purposes
of the Disciplinary Rules and conforms to professional norms and
societal expectations.‖75 This opinion is specifically limited to nongovernment attorneys supervising investigators, however, and does
not address whether government attorneys may direct investigations
by law enforcement personnel or whether attorneys may directly
engage in pretexting activities.76
Although several of these amendments and rules provide limited
guidance on the issue, at least they provide some direction for an
attorney analyzing his options prior to acting. This is of course
preferable to addressing the issue after the activity has occurred
because it provides more notice and enables attorneys to make more
of an educated choice on the matter. One issue to note, however, is
that every amendment or rule listed here permits pretexting; it does
not appear that any bar prohibiting pretexting has made that clear in
any rule. More bars should consider proactively amending the rules to
make it clear one way or the other what is permissible.
II. BALANCING THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY VERSUS PROFESSIONAL IMAGE
The area of Professional Responsibility is subject to differing
views, competing considerations, the ever-evolving public perception
of the legal profession, and changing technology. Therefore, clear
guidance on the subject is likely an unattainable goal. Certain issues
within Professional Responsibility have such far-reaching
implications, however, that they merit as much guidance as possible.

74
75
76

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
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In its analysis of pretexting, the referee in In re Hurley77 noted the
challenges facing attorneys in the criminal context:
Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult decision, with
concurrent and conflicting obligations: should he zealously
defend his client, fulfill his constitutional obligation to
provide effective assistance of counsel, and risk breaking a
vague ethical rule that, according to the record, had never
been enforced in this way? Or should he knowingly fail to
represent Mr. Sussman in the manner to which he was
entitled and hand him persuasive grounds for appeal, an
ethics complaint, and a malpractice claim? The Sixth
Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr. Hurley.78
Although pretexting occurs in other areas of the law and does not
always implicate constitutional rights, it has a direct impact on the
public‘s perception of the legal profession. And as the internet has
improved the ability to dissemble one‘s identity and purpose in
collecting evidence, pretexting is likely to become more routine.
Therefore, it is surprising that so many state bars have failed to
clearly address the issue.
Looking beyond the obvious constitutional implications, at the
heart of the issue are the competing policy considerations. On one
hand, lawyers are charged with zealously advocating for their clients
within the bounds of the legal system.79 On the other, lawyers are
expected to approach the practice of law in a manner that instills
public confidence in the profession.80 This is why those charged with
leading the Bar should provide guidance. The Preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct notes that when ―conflicting
responsibilities are encountered‖ in the practice of law, they should be
―resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.‖81
Without adequate guidance, however, lawyers have to face two very
significant yet competing considerations and later face the
consequences.

No. 2007AP478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008).
Id. at *36.
79 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2009) (―As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client‘s position under the rules of the adversary system.‖).
80 See id. at [6] (―[A] lawyer should further the public‘s understanding of and confidence
in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.‖).
81 Id. at [9].
77
78
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It is clear that more guidance is needed for attorneys that wish to
conduct pretexting activities on the internet. In analyzing the myriad
of approaches taken by the judiciary and bar associations, several are
clearly deficient. If there is to be adequate guidance on this issue,
uniformity and clarity are essential to whatever standard is
established.
First, drawing a distinction between certain types of cases is
nonsensical. Perhaps the use of pretexting in certain types of cases is
easier to justify based on policy considerations, but as history shows,
situations change. New areas of the law develop over time and
circumstances change. Drawing a rule based on the current situation
necessarily results in another outdated rule in the near future.
Similarly, drawing a line based on the type of lawyer involved only
leads to an arbitrary and unfair distinction, especially when the line is
drawn between government and private attorneys. Permitting the
government‘s attorney to use deceit and misrepresentation against a
potential defendant but not permitting the defendant‘s attorney to do
the same against potential witnesses or suspects gives the government
an unfair advantage. If one party is permitting to engage in deceit, so
should the other.
Additionally, recognizing a ―gloss on the rule‖ that permits certain
activities that seemingly violate the Rules is far too subjective to
actually provide guidance. A lawyer who believes that his actions are
appropriate under this standard will later be judged by someone with
20/20 hindsight and perhaps a different set of ethical beliefs. Such a
rule cannot possibly be applied evenly. Furthermore, this rule
provides no guidance to the public. If a person is trying to understand
when his Facebook page may be accessed for evidentiary purposes,
this standard does nothing to clarify when or how pretexting may be
utilized. Since fostering public in the legal profession is one of the
primary public policies under consideration, this standard cannot hold
muster.
Finally, it is unacceptable to permit certain activities that violate
the plain text of the Rules based on finding an ―implied‖ exception.
This utterly fails to provide any guidance on permissible activity and
opens the door to more egregious behavior, as lawyers may believe
that they can justify violations of the rules by arguing that there is an
implied exception. The language of the Rules should be the guiding
force, without exception. If pretexting is to be permissible under the
Rules, it should be expressly permissible.
The remaining analysis boils down to whether pretexting should be
uniformly permissible under the Rules, and if so, under what
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circumstances. This can be determined by weighing the competing
considerations: zealous advocacy versus upholding the public image
of the bar. No clear consensus on this issue will ever be reached, but
that is typically the case in the area of professional responsibility. In
my view, however, the scales tip in favor of encouraging public faith
in the bar. Although zealous advocacy is certainly necessary, and at
times strikes at the heart of constitutional rights, our system of justice
cannot function properly without faith in the legal profession. As
Justice Kourlis wrote in the In re Pautler82 opinion:
Lawyers themselves are recognizing that the public
perception that lawyers twist words to meet their own goals
and pay little attention to the truth, strikes at the very heart of
the profession—as well as the heart of the system of justice.
Lawyers serve our system of justice, and if lawyers are
dishonest, then there is a perception that the system, too, must
be dishonest.83
If the rules of evidence need to be improved to provide better tools for
discovery, then perhaps that should be addressed so that pretexting is
not necessary. The image of the Bar cannot be improved by anything
other than the actions of its members, however, so it must be the
focus.
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